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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the ways in which Frederick Lugard 
used the Niger river and her subsidiaries as a tool to secure 
funding from Great Britain between 1900-1905. The 
annual reports written by Lugard were propaganda to 
convince Parliament of the value of the Nigerian project by 
showing progress towards the installation of “legitimate 
commerce”. This paper proves that the British were, 
especially in these early years of colonisation, to a great 
degree confined to the Niger river. Three cases are 
analysed to show to what extent Lugard is bound to the 
river for his propaganda: the abolition of illegitimate trade, 
the promotion of Nigeria to replace the USA and India as 
the new centre for cotton farming, and the redirection of 
commerce from the trans-Saharan route to the English 
sphere. This paper concludes that the river held an abstract 
value for the British coloniser: apart from being the major 
highway for trade and transport, it was also an important 
tool for Lugard’s propaganda. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of British colonialism in West Africa is a story 
of extreme transitions. The advent of paternalistic racism, 
quinine’s victory over malaria and the opening of the West 
African hinterland for transoceanic commerce occurred in 
the 19th century. Westminster’s colonial attitude also 
reversed completely in the wake of international rivalry at 
the Berlin conference of 1884, before which Westminster 
had little interest in West Africa. The reversal that 
happened in 1900, when the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria was established, was not the result of economic or 
humanitarian considerations, but of international pressure, 
as had been the conquest of India.1 French and German 
merchants and soldiers were encroaching on the Niger 
river, and Britain reluctantly retaliated, to stay in control of 
the profitable waterway.2 Frederick Lugard, who was 
appointed as the first High Commissioner of Northern 
Nigeria, was commissioned to stabilise and control the 
territory to deter foreign encroachment and secure 
commerce. Westminster was still reluctant to establish yet 
another expensive colony, so Lugard was pressed to 
                                                          
1 P. Moon, The conquest and dominion of India 
(London 1989), 6. 
2 A. Nzemeke, Imperialist venture in the Niger valley: 
1951-1905: a case study of Afro-British contacts in 
West Africa (Munster 1971), 35. 
3 This research concerns all the rivers of Northern 
Nigeria connected to the Niger river: including, but not 
limited to, the Benue, Kaduna and Gongola rivers. The 
progress and produce tangible results. The survival of his 
position, his protectorate and the stream of private and 
public funding, which made up the greater part of his total 
revenue, depended on the success of his project.  
Particularly in the early years of the Protectorate, British 
control was extremely limited. Commissioned to govern a 
tract of land twice the size of the British Isles, Lugard 
controlled only two things effectively: the political elite, 
which was dependent on the British Administration for their 
legitimacy, and the Niger river system.3 The role of the river 
Niger in the colonisation of (Northern) Nigeria, however, 
has so far evaded the attention of historians. Historians focus 
on the periods before the establishment of official British 
control in 1900 or after the amalgamation of the 
protectorates in 1912.4 The Niger river was key to the entire 
colonisation in general and specifically to Lugard’s 
representation of the colonisation of the North.  
The river Niger was firmly under British control because it 
was used by the river-borne traders of the Royal Niger 
Company (RNC) to conquer the Nigerian hinterland. The 
RNC had constructed trading posts, checkpoints and 
fortresses along the river banks. The land away from the 
river, however, was largely outside the British sphere of 
influence; so much so that the emir of Kontagora told his 
subjects that the British were a species of fish who could not 
live away from the river Niger.5 Torn between having a very 
limited impact on the proceedings in the Protectorate on the 
one hand and the pressure to prove its potential on the other, 
Lugard was forced to create an imagined positive image of 
his reign to ensure a continuing flow of funds from Britain. 
In his annual reports presented to the Colonial office, he 
wrote about different aspects of his colonial administration. 
These reports were almost exclusively positive, and 
intended to convince the British government public of the 
value of the Nigerian project. The annual report can be 
considered propaganda to promote the various aspects of the 
Protectorate and to lure investors, both public and private.  
The British imperialists used a narrative of “legitimate 
commerce” to justify their imperial expansion in the 19th 
century. They argued that, by conquering and administrating 
territories, they were spreading civilisation and improving 
standards of living. This research is built around the three 
pillars of legitimate commerce: the abolishment of 
“illegitimate commerce” such as slavery and the trade in 
liquor; the importation of wholesome (British) products and 
the exportation of local produce beneficial to the natives; 
term “Niger river system” is used throughout this essay 
to indicate all these rivers combined.  
4 For instance: T. Falola, Nigeria in the twentieth 
century (Durham, NC 2002); I. Nicolson, The 
administration of Nigeria: men, methods and myths 
(Oxford 1969); J. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the 
making of Nigeria (London 1960); M. Crowder, A short 
history of Nigeria. (New York 1966). 
5 Crowder, A short history, 211. 
and the introduction of a “fair” system of taxation.6 
This essay will argue that the Niger river was the most 
important tool for this propaganda because it was one of 
two areas of administration where Lugard could 
effectively exert control. Three case studies, themed after 
the pillars of legitimate trade, will analyse to what extent 
Frederick Lugard used the Niger river system as a tool to 
create a (false) image of progress towards the transition to 
legitimate commerce in Northern Nigeria between 1900 
and 1905 in the annual reports. This period is selected 
because it formed the basis for colonial policy throughout 
the history of amalgamated Nigeria and because it is the 
time in which Lugard shaped the appearance of legitimate 
commerce in Nigeria. This period is also largely neglected 
by other historians.  
Before discussing the three cases, this research will 
provide a description of the historic setting and the 
historiographic background, as well as the place of this 
research within it. The second chapter will prove that the 
annual reports cannot be trusted as they are mainly used to 
propagate Lugard’s agenda and, in a more general sense, 
provide a critical examination of the value of the annual 
report as a historic source. A quantitative analysis will 
show the discrepancy between the priorities portrayed in 
the annual reports and the aspects of administration that 
were prioritised in reality.  
The first case is the abolishment of illegitimate trade. The 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and the prohibition of 
the institution of slavery in 1833 had not truly ended 
slavery, so the abolition movement was still strong at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Lugard was well aware that 
joining in this movement would improve the public 
opinion of his Protectorate. The first case study will 
analyse how the Niger was used as a tool to put this image 
forward in the annual reports. Additionally, liquor trading 
was banned. There are many similarities between the ban 
on liquor and the slavery ban so it is covered in the same 
chapter.  
The second case study will analyse how Lugard attempted 
to make Northern Nigeria the new centre of cotton 
production after the decrease in supply from the United 
States caused a cotton crisis. Lugard used the river to 
persuade Westminster to invest in the cotton potential of 
Northern Nigeria.  
The third and final case study discusses the role of the river 
in Lugard’s portrayal of the internal trade routes of the 
Protectorate and how he worked to redirect them into the 
English commercial sphere.  
 
SECTIONS 
Quantitative analysis: 
The first chapter proves that the annual reports on which 
this research is based are a fictional depiction of the 
proceedings in the Protectorate. When compared to the 
much more factual Original Correspondence, a major 
dichotomy becomes apparent: the introduction of 
legitimate commerce that Lugard propagates in the 
annual reports are not nearly as important as more 
mundane matters that were handled far more often. 
Lugard is selective in his annual report and chooses only 
those subjects that would improve the standing of his 
functioning and the Protectorate in general for the reader 
of his report.  
                                                          
6 R. Law, From slave trade to “legitimate” commerce: 
the commercial transition in nineteenth-century West 
Africa (Cambridge, 1995), 21. 
 
Having proven that the annual reports are propaganda, this 
chapter goes on to show the three most prominent matters 
in the reports: slavery, trade, and cotton exports. These 
three subjects are the focal point of this research.  
 
Case study I: The abolition of illegitimate commerce 
This chapter shows the importance of the Niger system for 
the image that Lugard creates regarding slavery and the 
ban on liquor trading. Because Lugard was very limited in 
his influence over his territory, he used that part of the 
Protectorate that he does control effectively to collect 
success stories. This chapter compares the numerological 
difference between freed slaves on the land route (north of 
the river through the bush) and the Benue-borne slave 
transports. There were far more freed slaves on the river, 
which is logical following from the ineffectiveness of the 
land patrols. Lugard, however, presented this as proof that 
his administration was effectively banishing slavery from 
the land. 
This chapter also discusses both the inability of Lugard to 
end slavery and the unwillingness to do so. Too much of 
the local power that Lugard depended on (there are only 
little over 200 British people in Northern Nigeria at this 
time) was invested in the status quo of slave-ownership. 
Lugard not only used the numbers he gains from the river 
freeings, but also the horror stories. He used the harsh 
conditions that slaves, who were often children, to both 
gather support from the English population and an 
aversion against the Germans who participate in the slave 
trade.  
A similar argument is made regarding to the ban on the 
liquor trade, further proving the ineffectiveness of Lugards 
administration and the role of the river in creating a false 
image of control.  
 
Case study II: Cotton in Northern Nigeria 
During the American civil war, the British textile industry 
suffered a cotton shortage. The British turned to India to 
replace the USA as their main supply of cotton, but 
encountered three problems there: a lack of infrastructure, 
a disagreeable climate, and an inferior breed of cotton. 
Lugard used the river to promote Northern Nigeria as the 
best replacement of the USA in the second cotton crisis of 
1902, using the three Indian problems as the basis for his 
appeal. 
 
The river gave Northern Nigeria the added value of 
transportation. The annual reports are filled with subtle 
and less-than-subtle remarks on its effectiveness. Also, the 
river provided specialists on cotton with examples of the 
climate and the soils as well as the possibility for a proper 
kind of cotton to be planted in Northern Nigeria.  
 
These examples were then used to portray Northern 
Nigeria as the best candidate for the cotton hub of the 
British empire, with all the funding support that would go 
along with it. Lugard shows why Northern Nigeria is better 
by discrediting the other British colonies.  
Case study III: The redirection of existing trade to the English 
sphere. 
In this, too, the river would play a vital role. Lugard tried 
to prove that his Protectorate was worth all investment, 
because it held many existing trade routes and products 
available for exports. The existing trade routes were 
aimed north, towards the Sahara and Tripoli. Lugard used 
the river both in his narrative and as a tool to divert the 
northern trade to the coast and hence to Britain.  
 
The river would make a safe route compared to existing 
routes, because the British had forts along its banks and 
regularly patrolled it. Also, the river would be faster that 
the desert route. Thirdly, the river made for cheaper 
transport because of cowry exchange rates and camel 
costs could be largely avoided.  
 
A second way in which the river was used was by 
taxation. Landed taxation was ineffective, but taxation on 
the rivers was not. Several tax benefits were offered to 
traders to divert them south.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Frederick Lugard chose to create an image of his rule 
through his annual reports that did not correspond very 
closely at all with reality. His reports were written with 
the ulterior motive of convincing the British government 
to fund his Protectorate and trust in the commercial 
potential. He based his narrative on the British ideal of 
legitimate commerce, the popular movement that aimed 
to educate and help the native population of the English 
possessions which was used in reality to legitimise 
imperial expansion all over the world. Lugard writes 
about how he was removing slavery, which had always 
been the most important trade commodity of his region. 
Fuelled by the missionary ideals, he also fought against 
the trade in liquor. Both these efforts have been proven 
not to have happened in the way he described them, nor 
were they ever real aims of the Northern Nigerian policy. 
The abolition of illegitimate commerce was one piece of 
Lugard’s propaganda. To support his narrative, Lugard 
was dependent on the Niger river, where most of his 
successes came from. In his narrative, Lugard described 
the river system as the focal point of the slave trade, and 
when the trade on the river decreased he argued that slave 
trade throughout the Protectorate was diminishing. In 
reality, the trade had moved to bush routes beyond his 
control. Slavery would continue for decades in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, Lugard describes how Northern Nigeria 
was the best candidate to replace the deflating American 
cotton market during the second cotton crisis. The Niger 
was central for this argument as well: it provided 
transport that no other colony had and it provided 
samples that proved the suitability of the Northern 
Nigerian soil for the long-stapled cotton variety that the 
Lancashire industry needed. Again, the administration 
held no power over the land of the territory beyond the 
river. 
Lastly, the Niger would allow Lugard to redirect the 
existing trade in the Protectorate from the desert route to 
the English sphere. It provided safety and cheap 
transport. Subsequently, it allowed the administration to 
tax the added revenue. This narrative has also been 
proven false. 
The data gathered in this research can begin to fill the 
holes in the historiography of Northern Nigeria. It has 
added a valuable source to the debate and showed 
possibilities for continuation of the debate. Overall, it has 
proven the importance of geological factors in considering 
history, as no history of Nigeria can be complete without 
considering the river after which it was named. Lastly, this 
research has added to the conviction that the early colonial 
state enjoyed no real control over the peoples in its 
judiciary.  
’Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of 
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the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-Share 
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